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and the efficacy of measures such as credit scoring for SMEs; whether transaction lending
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Introduction
In recent years, while the Indian economy has been growing
at over 6%, the production from micro, small and medium* Tel.: þ91 80 26993280; fax: þ91 2658 4050.
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doi:10.1016/j.iimb.2010.04.011enterprises has been growing at over 11% between
2002e2003 and 2007e2008 (Ministry of Micro, Small and
Medium Enterprises, 2008e2009).
In India, banks are the dominant channel for providing
funds to industry. However their importance in funding
smaller firms is even more pronounced since most small
and medium enterprises (SMEs1) are not able to access
the capital markets for funds. In recent years, govern-
ments and policy makers have been giving considerable
attention to facilitate the development of the SME sector,
as a strong and vibrant SME sector provides a good foun-
dation for entrepreneurship and innovation in the
economy.1 In this paper, we use SME to refer to the micro, small and
medium enterprises, although in the Indian context, MSME
(referring to micro, small and medium enterprises) is commonly
used.
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The census of micro, small and medium enterprises
(MSME) in 2006e2007 reveals that there are about 26
million MSMEs in India providing employment to 80 million
people. The MSME sector contributes 8% of India’s GDP,
generating 45% of manufactured output and 40% of
exports (Economic Survey, 2009e2010). The Government
of India enacted the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
Development Act 2006 to provide a policy framework for
the development of the MSMEs. The Micro, Small and
Medium Enterprises Development Act 2006 groups MSME
firms into manufacturing enterprises and service enter-
prises. A manufacturing firm with investment in plant and
machinery not exceeding Rs. 25 lakhs (2.5 million) is
considered a micro enterprise. Firms with investment in
plant andmachinery between Rs 25 lakhs and Rs 5 crores (50
million) are considered a small enterprise, and medium
enterprises are those where the investment is in the range
of Rs. 5 crores to Rs 10 crores (100 million). In the service
group, for investment in equipment of less than Rs 10 lakhs
(1 million), the firm would be in the micro category, if it is
between Rs 10 lakhs to Rs 2 crores (20million), then it would
fall in the small enterprise category; if investment in
equipment is in the range of Rs 2 crores to Rs 5 crores, then
it would fall in the medium enterprise category. In order to
get a sense of international comparison, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision defines an SME as a legal
entity, sole proprietorship or partnership where the
reported sales for the consolidated group of which the firm
is a part is less than V50 million. (Bank for International
Settlements, 2006, paragraph 273).
Financing SMEs in India: directed lending and credit
rationing
One of the major bottlenecks to the growth of SMEs in
India is access to finance. Banks are the dominant
channel for funding SMEs and in this paper, we survey
some of the major issues in the financing of SMEs in the
Indian context. While banks in India are not provided
with a specific target for lending to SMEs, the bank loans
given to the micro and small enterprises is part of the
priority sector lending. Indian banks are required to
achieve a target of 40% of adjusted net bank credit to
the priority sector, while foreign banks have a target of
32% exposure to the priority sector (Reserve Bank of
India, 2009). Information is a key input that goes into
the credit decision of banks and one of the challenges
for banks is to acquire information about the credit risk
of the borrower, as borrowers have more information
than the lender about the projects (Myers & Majluf,
1984). This fundamental information problem is a key
concern that needs to be addressed in the allocation of
loans; the absence of a mechanism to bridge the infor-
mation asymmetry between the borrower and the lender
would lead to a failure to allocate loans efficiently. This
information asymmetry becomes more pronounced for
loans to the SME sector as this sector is considered more
opaque for reasons that would be discussed later in the
paper.Bankers consider two aspects of the loan in their credit
decisiondthe interest rate on the loan and the credit risk
of the loan. However, as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have
argued, the interest rate itself affects the risk of the loan
due to two factors. First, is adverse selection; that is, only
more risky projects would come forth for loans at higher
interest rates; and second, moral hazard, as borrowers
who have been granted the loan at a higher interest rate
would undertake a more risky project in order to earn
higher expected returns. As a result, at higher interest
rates, the expected return from a loan would start
decreasing after a point due to higher defaults. Thus, in
the presence of information asymmetry in the market for
loans and costly monitoring, banks would not use interest
rates alone to equate demand and supply, but would
ration credit.
Carbo, Rodrı´guez, and Udell (2008) argue that the issue
of bank competition and credit availability may matter
most to SMEs for two reasons. First, SMEs are more
vulnerable to information problems. Second, SMEs are
much more bank-dependent than large enterprises. Carbo
et al.’s (2008) study of a large number of Spanish SMEs
suggests that constrained firms with restricted access to
the bank loan market may turn to the trade credit market
to exploit their investment opportunities, while uncon-
strained firms would turn to the bank loan market. Addi-
tionally, they analyse the supply side of the trade credit
market by testing whether the extension of trade credit is
sensitive to bank lending. They find that there is a signifi-
cant sensitivity of the extension of trade credit to bank
lending for unconstrained firms, thereby, suggesting that
these financially unconstrained firms may act as‘lenders’
due to their easier access to a less costly source of funding
(bank loans).
Banerjee, Cole, and Duflo (2003), using a 1998
enhancement in investment limit as eligibility criteria for
preferential bank loans for SMEs in India, find that firms
that newly came under the preferential lending criteria
were able to obtain more loans with a consequent benefi-
cial impact on increase in sales, suggesting that that these
firms were previously credit constrained.
The other argument is that SME firms have lower
profitability and therefore banks are reluctant to lend to
them. Bhattacharya, Faiz, and Zohir (2000) identified
that banks are averse to lend to SMEs as they do not
consider them as attractive and profitable undertakings.
SMEs are also regarded as high-risk borrowers because of
their low capitalisation, insufficient assets, and high
mortality rates.
Framework for analysing SME financing
Berger and Udell (2006) have proposed a conceptual
framework for the analysis of SME credit availability
issues. They argue that in the context of loans to SMEs,
two factors affect the availability of loans and the nature
of the credit facility. First is the lending technology which
refers to the combination of primary information source,
screening and underwriting policies and procedures, loan
contract structure and monitoring mechanisms which are
used in the lending business. Second is the lending infra-
structure which includes the information environment
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judicial and bankruptcy environments, the social environ-
ment, the tax environment and the regulatory environ-
ment in which financial institutions operate in a given
country. The government policies influence the lending
technology used in different countries, through the lending
infrastructure.
The lending technologies employed to lend to the SME
sector in India would thus be influenced by the government
policies and the lending infrastructure prevalent in the
country. Lending technology is categorised into two types:
transactions lending that is based on ‘hard’ quantitative
data and relationship lending which is based on ‘soft’
qualitative information. Transaction lending would rely
more on quantitative data such as financial statements,
small business credit scoring, asset based lending,
factoring, fixed asset lending and leasing.2 It is estimated that successful transition of a family business
from the first to the second generation happens in only 30% of the
cases (Birley, 1986).Transactions lending and relationship lending
Petersen and Rajan (2002) find that small firms, though
informationally opaque, have been borrowing from insti-
tutions further away, and they attribute this to the
development of firms such as Dun and Bradsteets, which
specialise in rating small businesses. The possible reason
is that credit scoring helps to reduce the information
asymmetry, particularly with respect to small firms and
hence geographic proximity of the borrower and lender is
not crucial to loan decisions. Other studies also find that
credit scoring tends to enhance SME access to debt
capital (Berger, Frame, & Miller, 2005a; Frame, Sriniva-
san, & Woosley, 2001; Frame and Woosley, 2004). Rec-
ognising that better credit information can directly
increase the amount of financing for SMEs by reducing the
risk and costs arising from information asymmetries, the
Credit Information Bureau of India Limited (CIBIL) has
been established as a publiceprivate partnership to
enhance the availability of credit information to member
financial institutions. (The shareholders of CIBIL are State
Bank of India (40%), Housing Development Finance
Corporation Limited (40%), Dun and Bradstreet Informa-
tion Services India Private Limited (10%), and TransUnion
International Inc. (10%).) CIBIL is mandated to collect and
disseminate credit information on individuals and firms of
all sizes and its creation is an important step in the
improvement of the asset quality of banks and financial
institutions. The Small Industries Development Bank of
India (SIDBI) in association with ten banks and Dun and
Bradstreet has set up the SME Rating Agency of India Ltd
(SMERA) as an exclusive rating agency for MSMEs.
Love and Mylenko (2003) find that the existence of
private credit registries is associated with lower financing
constraints and a higher share of bank financing. They also
find that small and medium firms, as well as younger firms,
benefit from bank financing in countries with private credit
registries. Thus, the availability of credit scores for SMEs
would lead to greater use of transaction technology for
lending to SMEs in India.
While transaction lending such as asset based lending,
factoring and leasing have been in use to fund SMEs for
some time, there is some evidence of relationship lending
in India. In developing countries, the private economywould comprise largely of family businesses. It is estimated
that in India, family businesses account for 70% of the total
sales and net profits of the biggest 250 private-sector
companies (The Economist, 1996), and almost all MSME
would be family firms. Inter-family relationships and family
succession play an important role in the performance of
family firms, and banks would need to take this into
account in their credit decisions2. A study by Marisetty,
Ramachandran, and Jha (2008) finds that family businesses
in India where succession takes place without fights and
splits show higher profitability. This would suggest that
a credit officer should also be aware of inter-family rela-
tionships as the souring of these relationships could signif-
icantly change the credit risk of the family firm.
Bank size and lending to SMEs
A major policy concern in recent times is the impact of the
growth in size of banks on availability of credit to the SME
sector. A number of studies have analysed the relationship
between bank size and the credit flow to firms of different
sizes.
Berger et al. (2005b) find that large institutions have
comparative advantages in transactions lending to more
transparent SMEs, while small institutions have compara-
tive advantages in relationship lending to informationally
opaque SMEs, based on soft information. Competitive
banking markets can weaken relationship building by
depriving banks of the incentive to invest in soft informa-
tion. Therefore, less competitive markets may be associ-
ated with more credit availability (Petersen & Rajan, 2002).
Morris, Basant, Das, Ramachandran, and Koshy (2001)
argue that there are strong structural underpinnings to the
inadequate flow of funds to the SME sector. They argue that
the organisational structure of banks in India and processes
within them, have taken them far from task orientation,
and have created a specific bias against small loan
portfolios.
Another observation that is relevant to the problem of
the Indian financial system is that there is no transparency
regarding the financial conditions of SMEs. Therefore, banks
hesitate to give loans to small scale units. There is evidence
to establish that a fairly significant proportion of loans
given to small enterprises in the past have compounded the
problem of non-performing assets (NPAs) of banks. Unless
fairly detailed information on small firms is available, banks
would hesitate to take the risk and may prefer to lend to
relatively larger firms to comply with regulation, thus
leaving smaller firms significantly constrained for capital.
Improving the quality of financial information is an impor-
tant requirement for enhancing the flow of funds to the SME
sector, as the quality of information also influences deci-
sions on loan finance (Das, 2007).
Foreign banks and SME lending
There is considerable debate about the impact of foreign
banks on the availability of credit to small businesses. Some
argue that the entry of foreign banks could lead to misal-
location of credit, which in turn could negatively affect
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for investment and growth. In a study of the transition
economies, Weller (1999) argues that big foreign banks are
not going to lend money to SMEs, small traders, the
informal sector and farmers but that they tend to serve less
risky businesses such as transnational corporations (TNCs)
and big corporate groups.
The EPWResearch Foundation (2006) in a study of financial
inclusion argued that foreign banks tend to follow ‘exclusive
banking’ by offering services to a small number of clients,
instead of ‘inclusive banking’. Foreign banks charged higher
fees from customers for providing banking services and
maintaining a bank account in a foreign bank required
substantial financial resources. Evidence from Latin America
suggests that foreign banks are especially risk averse and that
significant market penetration by foreign banks in a devel-
opingeconomycontextmight adversely affect creditdisbursal
to small andmediumenterprises (Clarke, Cull, Peria, Soledad,
& Sanchez, 2005). However, Clarke et al. (2005) also find that
some foreign banks make more loans to small businesses than
domestic banks.
Berger et al. (2005b), in a study of bank organisational
form and its impact on lending, find that banks that are
large, centralised, and have their headquarters situated
abroad may lack the organisational dexterity to engage
with small and young firms successfully.
However, Banerjee and Duflo (2004) have argued that
credit rationing on account of risk averseness is not specific
to domestic private and foreign banks. They show, using
Indian data, that public sector banks can also exhibit such
risk averseness, albeit more on account of the political
economy of ‘blame sharing’ in the event of bad perfor-
mance of banks rather than the profit motive. In this
respect, the working group on banking chaired by M.S.
Verma observed that the diffidence that seems to beset
banks in taking credit decisions can be attributed to
investigations by outside agencies on the accountability of
bank staff in respect of NPAs (Tannan, 2001). In other
words, the behaviour of banks in the credit markets of
emerging economies may not be some monotonic function
of ownership; credit disbursal by banks in such (inherently
high-risk) markets may depend on a host of other factors.
Hence, it is worthwhile exploring the credit market
behaviour of banks in emerging market contexts.
The lending infrastructure in India
The legal environment is also an important factor that
impacts the willingness of banks to lend to small firms.
Haselmann and Wachtel (2007) find in their study of 20
transition economies that foreign banks are more inclined
to lend to small and medium enterprises if creditor
protection is strong. In order to strengthen the framework
for tackling loan defaults and contract enforcement, India
enacted the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial
Assets and Enforcement of Security Interests (SARFAESI) Act
in 2002. The Act empowers secured creditors to foreclose
and enforce securities in case of default, without inter-
vention of a court or tribunal, and has also created an
enabling framework for asset reconstruction companies and
securitisation in general. New bankruptcy legislation was
enacted in 2003. There are several asset reconstruction
companies and along with other banks and institutions,SIDBI has set up a separate asset reconstruction company
focussed on asset recovery of SME non-performing loans.
The SARFAESI Act and the consequent strengthening of the
legal environment should enable an increased flow of credit
to the SME sector.
The availability of credit scores for SMEs in India should
also help to enhance the quality and reliability of financial
information enabling more lending to the sector.
In India, while the domestic banks are given a priority
sector lending target (which includes lending to the micro,
small and medium enterprises) of 40% of adjusted net
bank credit (ANBC), foreign banks have been set a target
of only 32% of ANBC. It has been argued that both
domestic and foreign banks should have the same target
towards lending to the priority sector in order to provide
a level playing field for all banks and to get all banks
actively involved in the faster development of the priority
sector.
Securitisation in India, involving asset-backed securities
(ABS) and mortgage-backed securites (MBS) has been done
since the 1990s. However, ABS with SME loans as underlying
security was done only in recent years. There were 12 SME
ABS pools as of September 2009, with the first being issued
in 2007, with the number of SME ABS pools being about 10%
of the total ABS issues (CRISIL Ratings, 2009).
Although the securitisation of SME loans is small, that it
is beginning to occur is evidence that the institutional
environment for contract enforcement of loan collateral is
improving.
Basel capital norms and its impact on funds for SMEs
Capital standards require banks to keep a minimum
capital against their assets in order to protect the inter-
ests of the depositors and to ensure that there is adequate
capital to absorb potential losses. Under Basel II capital
standard, the risk weights for different classes of assets
depend on the risk of the assets. Basel II capital standards
allow banks to categorise the SME lending as ‘retail
portfolio’ which would require a lower risk weight of 75%
compared to 100% risk weight for a BBB rated loan (Bank
for International Settlements, 2006).
Altman and Sabato (2005) in a study of US SME firms
found that SME loan portfolio behaviour is better under-
stood using a credit risk model using ratios appropriate to
and calibrated for SME portfolios rather than credit models
used for large corporates. Banks would gain from lower
capital requirements using credit risk models appropriate
for the SME portfolio.
Dietsch and Petey (2004) use a one-factor credit risk
model to provide new estimates of stationary default prob-
abilities and asset correlations in two large samples of
French and German SMEs. The results suggest that on
average, SMEs are riskier than large businesses; the asset
correlations in the SME population are very weak (1e3% on
average) and decrease with size. On average, the relation-
ship between probability of defaults and asset correlations is
not negative, as assumed by Basel II, but positive, especially
at the industry level, in the two countries. It is also possible
to distinguish different segments inside the SME population:
at least between very small and small SMEs and large SMEs.
Jacobson, Linde´, and Roszbach (2005), in a study of the
SME portfolio of two Swedish banks, find no evidence that
Ranjana Kumar is a prominent Indian banker. Known as
the ‘Turnaround Queen of India’, she was responsible
for the turnaround of Indian Bank in her role as
Chairman and Managing Director. After her retirement
as Chairperson of the National Bank for Agriculture and
Rural Development (NABARD), she served, till
recently, as the Vigilance Commissioner in the Central
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economic capital than corporate loans.
The evidence so far is mixed as far as the impact of
Basel II capital standards on bank loans to the SME sector
is concerned. While the lower risk weight for retail port-
folios should reduce the bank’s cost of lending to the SME
sector, the actual credit losses from the SME sector may
not be significantly different from lending to the larger
firms.Vigilance Commission, Government of India.3
3 The Interview with Ranjana Kumar was conducted by Professor
Ashok Thampy and Rohini Ramachandran, the student represen-
tative from tejas@iimb, IIMB’s knowledge portal.Conclusion
The SME sector in India, which includes the micro, small
and medium enterprises, constitutes an important part of
the economy. However, a major concern for the SMEs is the
availability of an adequate amount of finances. The
government has recognised the key role that the SME
segment plays in creating new enterprises and in providing
employment to a large segment of the population and has
adopted several public policy measures to enhance flow of
credit to the sector.
One of the prominent measures used to ensure
adequate flow of funds to the SME sector is through
regulation requiring banks to provide at least 40% of loans
to targeted areas which include the micro, small and
medium enterprises. Although directed lending would
increase the flow of funds to the SME sector, studies such
as Banerjee et al. (2003) suggest that SME firms are credit
constrained. One of the significant issues in lending to
SMEs is the use of both ‘hard’ data such as financial
information, as well as ‘soft’ data such as feedback from
vendors and other family members, which become
important inputs towards understanding the credit risk of
the business. The challenge for banks is to bridge the
information asymmetry so as to take the appropriate
lending decision so that the good firms are not financially
constrained, and at the same time, cut down on exposures
to bad credit risks.
Measures such as credit scoring for SMEs should improve
the quality of financial information and enable greater
funding for the sector. The SARFAESI Act and the
strengthening of legal provisions to take possession of
assets used as security has improved the legal environment
for lending in India, thus lowering the cost of lending and
enforcement of contracts.
Ghosh (2006) reports in a study covering the period
1995e2004, that since liberalisation, cash flow has
become less important for the firm’s investments,
implying that financial liberalisation improves the access
of financially constrained firms to external finance, and
thus financing has eased for smaller firms. While it may
be too early to conclude that SME firms in India are not
financially constrained, the reforms in the financial
sector and the improvement in the lending infrastruc-
ture has certainly improved access to finance for small
firms.
Some issues raised in this paper were put to Ranjana
Kumar, a well-known banker in India, to get insights on the
practical matters relating to issues raised in the academic
literature concerning bank financing of SMEs and the asso-
ciated issue of credit risk management.In conversation with Ranjana Kumar3Credit appraisal and credit rating
AT/tejas: What risk assessment mechanisms are typically
used to assess borrowers? With the increased focus on risk
assessment post the global financial crisis, what changes
have been made to strengthen the process?
RK: As far as credit appraisal in India is considered, when
we get a new account, we ask for the balance sheet. If it is
an existing concern, we analyse the balance sheet for the
last three years, the profit and loss, the project report of
the company to see how it has been doing and then, on the
basis of the project report, we will assess what the
requirement isdwhether a term loan is required to
purchase plant and machinery etc. or just working capital
for running the concern.
It is better that the bankwhich handles the financing of the
term loan also takes care of the working capital. In the past,
organisations like the Industrial Development Bank of India
(IDBI) and the Industrial Financial Corporation of India (IFCI),
whichwerebasically term lending institutions at one time, got
into problems of high non-performing assets (NPAs) because
they gave only term loans. They did not keep the working
capital accounts with them. The working capital accounts
were kept by the various commercial banks and theywere the
ones who also got the income from the operations.
Most importantly, when we now give such loans, we take
charge of the plant and machinery and the mortgage of the
land. The bank can also consider taking some collateral
security but this is just a comfort factor, not the main source
of recovery for the bank. The main source of repayment to
the bank is from the operations of the company.
Over a period of time, there has been an increased
emphasis on monitoring the account. So you take monthly
information now where earlier it used to be quarterly.
Everything is computerised so it is easy for the concern to
give the information to youd details such as their actual
sales against their projected sales, what have they done etc.
I particularly want to emphasise one thing and that is
regular contact with the customer. Traditionally we say,
know your borrower like the back of your hand.
AT/tejas: In your past role as the Managing Director of
Indian Bank, one of the problems you handled was the high
NPAs on the balance sheet. Did you find a causal relation-
ship between high NPAs and the credit appraisal process? If
yes, what measures did you take to improve the process?
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was the faulty credit appraisal. There was no in-depth
appraisal at all. In a large number of accounts, banks were
judging people based on the fact that so-and-so is well
known or the company is well known. Banking cannot work
like that. You have to do an in-depth analysis. So the credit
appraisal was faulty.
In Indian Bank, subsequent to the restructuring, we
decided to demarcate accounts. We saiddlet us have
corporate branches or credit intensive branches such that
large credit is given only through those branches. Every
branch will not be doing it. You will do it only through
certain specialised branches which would have policies in
place on how the appraisal would be done. Also, officers
with thorough knowledge and experience were posted in
those branches. These officers, at all levels, were trained in
an institute of the State Bank of India (SBI) which is known
for its credit appraisal. Further, internal audit was also
strengthened.
AT/tejas: Foreign credit appraisal firms incorporate non
banking information into their credit rating process, which
results in a more comprehensive process. Do you see this as
a necessity in India and is the process feasible to implement?
RK: It is important to have total knowledge of your
customer. Let us say a bank has the best account. However,
everything may not be going well all the time. So you have
to find out whether the promoter has the wherewithal to
come out of a difficult situation i.e. how resilient your
borrower is. For this, you would need information on their
expertise, their experience, the people who head their
departments, and their internal policies, and not just the
balance sheet.
For example, take the gems and jewellery business. This
is basically a family business. So what a prudent banker
should do is find out the tensions and alignments in the
family. Suppose a banker wants to reduce exposure in
a unit, he has to act well in time while the account is still
a standard asset. So if you meet the family and the people
associated regularly you would be able to sense that
something may come up and you would take a decision well
in time to limit your exposure. Therefore, we should aim to
be in touch with customers all the time and get market
information from them directly. I am not saying that such
information has to be totally relied on, but you can use it
judiciously to your benefit.
AT/tejas: With the emergence of multiple credit rating
agencies in India, do you see a problem in terms of data
integrity and increased transaction costs?
RK: Of course, there will be a cost to that. Whether the
cost will be paid by the borrower or the bank, we do not
know. Now suppose an SME wants to get itself rated, it takes
that as a plus point when it goes to the banker. It would
involve a cost of course, that is how the rating agencies
sustain themselves. But the most important thing will be the
objectivity and the acceptability of the rating agency. And
perhaps another issue that could come up is the various
yardsticks that the rating agency uses to come up with the
rating, and whether they keep that a secret or not.
AT/tejas: Given that the current ratings are not freely
accessible to borrowers, does this data asymmetry pose
a threat to consumers by potentially allowing financial
institutions to charge higher rates than warranted?RK: Quite right. I think it has been suggested now that the
borrowers must know why they are rated. In this kind of
interest rate regime, where interest rates have been
deregulated (though banks are by and large following the
same interest rates) there are differences. So borrowers
would like to know how they are being judged. I think in all
fairness the borrower should know how he is being rated and
the bankers should have a very open policy on that. Of course,
there would always be some kind of subjectivity at times.
AT/tejas: Coming more specifically to SMEs. what would
be the impact of SME credit rating on availability of funds to
the SME sector?
RK: Having in place an effective ‘credit rating’ is
certainly a desirable practice for all kinds of borrowers/
advances, SMEs included. However looking in to the sheer
number of borrowers who fall under this category, the task
would be a stupendous one.
Further, this would be possible in the case of established
firms with a track record, and it would be difficult in the
case of new firms. For new firms, the background of the
promoters, their qualifications and experience in the area
of an activity becomes vital.
In addition, with the small number of ‘Credit Rating
Agencies’ presently available, banks/financial institutions
would need to develop the necessary expertise in-house.Problems in unsecured loans
AT/tejas: A common accusation that has been laid at the
door of the loans business (specifically unsecured loans) is
the chase for new customers, which results in relaxation of
the credit worthiness criteria. What is your reading of the
situation?
RK: You are absolutely right. Bankers are saying, and the
government also expects, that there has to be a year-on-
year (y-o-y) growth. Let us say 18% a year. Now this may not
be possible y-o-y. For any credit institution, some time
must be given for consolidation. An 18% growth is very high.
For example, in today’s circumstances, the bankers have
said, in the recent meeting of the Indian Banks Association,
that this year, we may grow by a maximum of 16%. Some
may be able to achieve this while some may not. The
question is that of the expectation.
Since the economy has to grow, people have to be given
loans, credit has to expand. But it has to be done with
proper analysis and reasoning based on data. We cannot go
on a wild goose chase, pursuing numbers, saying you have
to do it. It should not be that kind of pressure. Then the
quality of the advance, as you said, will definitely suffer.
And not just the quality of the advance, monitoring is very
important. Work does not end in the sanctioning of the
account; that is where it starts.
AT/tejas: The past few years have seen many players
exiting the unsecured personal loan (UPL) space, particu-
larly in small ticket personal loans. Would a microfinance
model through self help groups (SHGs) be a viable form of
risk reduction given the difficulty of assessing the credit
worthiness of this segment?
RK: Microfinance has been here for almost 15e20 years.
It started in a big way in South India. Andhra Pradesh was
one of the first; Karnataka and Tamil Nadu followed in
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like Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat etc. but you are
right, there is a smaller risk in doing it through SHGs. And
one of the reasons why banks were so upbeat about SHGs
(of course, social lending was also mandatory) was because
their recoveries were 98e100%. Which banker would not
want to go for them?
These SHGs are not necessarily agriculture-based. They
could be connected with products or other activities such
as making things in the rural areas. Today people are
becoming much more quality conscious. So SHGs should also
be conscious of the market and the quality standards and
they should get equipped with the right information and
training.
So the success of microfinance will come provided you
train the staff, equip them, make them conscious of the
market, upgrade their skills and most important, do not
have a middleman between the groups and the buyer. The
benefit of this is that they meet the consumer and they are
able to understand the needs of the consumer. That is
a sustainable model. It should not be a flash in the pan.Future of credit appraisal
AT/tejas: How will the Unique ID scheme, if successfully
implemented impact the credit appraisal process and the
role of credit rating agencies in India?
RK: This scheme would help financial inclusion, especially
in the rural and semi-urban areas. Credit rating agencies
perhaps could use this as a tool for their own ratings. But I
think the real benefit would also be if everybody gets this
number; then there would not be a situation where some-
body gets a benefit which actually should be given to
somebody else. These things do happen sometimes in rural
areas. That is why for the last couple of years we are talking
about financial inclusion where we want every person in the
rural and semi-urban areas to have a bank account.
A scheme like the Unique ID will definitely help.
AT/tejas: Initially in the US, incentives were given in
order to make housing affordable to everyone, especially
low-income segments. Going forward, from a government
regulation standpoint, how can a balance be maintained
between stricter credit appraisal to reduce risk, and
ensuring affordability and credit access to lower income
groups?
RK: In the US, if I understand right, in some cases at least
they do not insist on the borrower’s stake in a loan. There
has to be some stake of the borrower in any loan. Only then
will there be a reason for him to repay. The important thing
is the income generating capacity of the person to pay.
Take agriculture. It is a state subject. So now it is for the
state to see that the farmer is provided with the right
fertilizers, the right quality of seeds, and the right pesti-
cides. Thebank can only give a loan. But the seeds, fertilizers
etc. should bemade availablewell in time before the crop. If
the critical period goes away and then you give the loan,
obviously it will be used for other things. So it is a joint
responsibility. It is not just the bankers who are responsible;
it is also the state government. And they must take very
strong action against those flooding themarket with spurious
things. If this is taken care of, why will the standard of livingnot increase for the farmer? So help him in this wayddon’t
just give him free credit. Then he becomes more account-
able, more responsible and his self-esteem goes up.Bank lending to the SME sector
AT/tejas: The Basel II capital standard allows SME lending
to be placed under the retail portfolio with a risk weight of
75% while the risk weight for BBB corporate loans is 100%.
What would be the effect of Basel II on availability and cost
of bank loans to the SME sector?
RK: The potential for lending to the SME sector in India is
enormous. We need to explore further the potential for the
growth of this sector which is linked to the growth of the
economy of the country in general.
Experience has shown that the SME sector is becoming
more efficient in terms of production vis a vis persons
employed. According to the recent report by the Ministry of
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMS), the produc-
tion during 2008e2009 went up by 11.4% whilst the number
of persons employed rose by 5.2%. In the same fiscal year,
12.37 lakh (1.237 million) new enterprises were added to
this sector. This speaks of better utilisation of capacity and
effective practices being followed by this sector.
Against this backdrop, the reduction in risk weights for
the retail portfolio will help improve the additional
approvals of loans. It is therefore an opportunity for
bankers to enhance loans to SMEs. In financing to large
corporates the risk would be more concentrated among
comparatively fewer activities, whereas the same amount
of loans to the SME sector will be spread over a larger
number of units and a larger cross section of activities and
disciplines, and consequently the risk will also be spread
over a larger number of SMEs.
However, it should be borne in mind that the basic
fundamentals of having a sound project/firm, with proper
technical and financial viability is absolutely essential.
AT/tejas: Banks use both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ information
to assess the risk of SMEs. What ‘soft’ information would
you consider important for credit decisions?
RK: Banks require, on an annual basis, a statement of
‘net worth’ of the promoters, directors, partners etc. to
assess their credit worthiness.
Some soft information could be on the following:
1. Initiatives taken by the borrowers to increase their
sales i.e. effective marketing initiatives, which could
include details of the borrowers/firms participating in
major domestic/international exhibitions to display
their products, the number of enquiries received by
them at such exhibitions and how many such enquiries
have culminated in to firm orders.
2. Whether there is a quick turnover (observed during
inspection visits to the firms) of key personnel manning
sensitive posts such as Technical, Finance, Marketing
etc., in the company. A quick turnover indicates that
there is a problem in retaining such important
personnel in the organisation.
3. An assessment of the ability of the firm in realising long
overdue payments due to the company, whether the
company ismaking greater efforts and initiating different
100 A. Thampystrategies for the same. This indicates the tenacity of the
firm and its promoters and is therefore an asset.
AT/tejas: What are the issues that bankers would be
monitoring in the case of SMEs?
RK: Monitoring of the performance of SMEs would involve
several areas. A few are as follows:
1. As stated in point 1 above, whether the SME is partici-
pating in select trade fairs, the nature of enquiries it has
been able to generate, and what proportion of the same
have been converted into firm orders e this would help
to gauge and monitor the firm’s strength in marketing.
2. In the case of manufacturing firms, the quality of the
product is important and the aspects that should be
monitored include whether complaints are received on
quality, whether the company has in place an effective
after sales service, and so on. It is expected that afirm that
providesafter sales service is likely toprocurehigher sales/
orders. Record also needs to be provided of ‘rejections’
and whether they are in tune with that of the industry.
3. Aspects such as the quality of machines, background/
track record of the suppliers, inventory of spares etc.
4. The measures that are being taken to train personnel,
including on-the-job training.
5. Information on the pricing of products, competitiveness
of the firm, market share, margins of profit and how
they compare with the competitors’, and bench
marking the same against the Industry.
All the above details must be sought by the banker and
provided by the borrower on a regular basis. Before
granting an advance, the ‘appraisal’ is critical and of
utmost importance. However, regular monitoring is equally,
if not more important.
In banking parlance, it is often said that a second-class
appraisal accompanied by first class monitoring can still
keep the unit healthy and it would survive, whereas a first
class appraisal with weak monitoring can lead to problems.
Most of the working capital limits are approved with
hypothecation of stock, knowledge of where the stock lies
(as security for the bank) with the borrower, and so on.
Therefore monitoring through timely and effective stock
inspection on a monthly basis is vital.
In the case of large/corporate borrowers, quarterly
audited balance sheets are required in addition to quarterly
information systems reports, and also critical information
on a monthly basis. Banks also are required to carry out
a stock audit for large corporate borrowers, the frequency
of which is determined by the bank.
In thecaseofbothSMEsandcorporateborrowers,diversion
of funds if any, should be closely monitored. For example,
banks should verify if the sales report matches with the funds
inflow and reflects in the ‘Credits’ in the account.
Generally, the ability of SMEs to absorb risk is lower than
for large corporates and at times, due to lack of knowledge
or experience, SMEs may not be fully aware of their own
condition. The banker needs to play a key role in moni-
toring and making sure of the health of the SME.
At certain times, possibly due to extraneous circum-
stances, borrowers, including SMES, go through roughweather and difficulties, which may not be of their
making. At such times, restructuring/rehabilitation of the
unit may be required. It is generally seen that bankers
tend to delay the process of restructuring. Timely
restructuring of accounts would be much more important
for an SME. Therefore the banker has to be very alert to
the requirements and the position of the SME’s financial
requirements at all times, and more so while restructur-
ing. Financial assistance to the SME has to be ‘timely’ and
‘adequate’.
Whether the borrower is an SME or a large corporate, the
banker has to understand that the borrower is a partner of
the bank, as the business is financed by the bank and the
bank should therefore know the pulse of the account.
In the case of an SME account going through difficulties,
the deterioration takes place much faster in case
corrective steps are not initiated in time. Therefore, the
banker should be alert to the changes occurring in such
accounts so as to be able to respond in time. It is very
important that the banker knows his borrower like the
back of his hand.
It is also suggested that banks provide Quality Counsel-
ling Centres to assist the SME sector, manned by competent
and experienced personnel.
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